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GENDER AND NATION-BUILDING: FAMILY LAW AS
LEGAL ARCHITECTURE
Tracy E. Higgins* and Rachel P. Fink**
I. INTRODUCTION
In considering the legal architecture of nation-building, we might most readily
think of public law as our subject insofar as it governs the relationship between the
individual and the state, and establishes the institutions of governance and the sources
and limits of their power.1 The essays in this volume, in large part, track this instinct
in that they concern themselves with fields such as constitutional law, criminal law, and
public international law. Closer to the margin of public and private law are essays
dealing with various dimensions of the modern regulatory state, including banking and
commercial transactions. In each of these fields of law, the connection between the
legal framework and the state structure is reasonably clear. This is perhaps less true
for family law.
Although the discipline of family law in the western legal tradition transcends the
public/private law boundary in many ways,2 it is the argument of this Essay that family

* Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights, Fordham Law School, Co-Director, Leitner
Center for International Law and Justice.
** J.D., Fordham Law School, 2007, Dean’s Fellow at the Leitner Center for International Law and
Justice.
1. See generally Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423 (1982); see also Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization,
Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006). Randy Barnett has written of the
public/private spheres:
For several decades now American legal thought has suffered from a pervasive
schizophrenia. In one sphere lies “public law”—the rules which determine the relationship
between citizen and state; rules which are based on principles of “public” governance; rules
which are usually prosecuted or defended by state officials and adjudicated in state courts.
In another sphere lies “private law”—the rules which define the legal relationships between
individuals; rules which are based on principles of private rights and responsibilities; rules
which are usually prosecuted by private “plaintiffs” and defended by private “defendants.”
Randy Barnett, Reviewed Work – Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain by Richard
A. Epstein, 97 ETHICS 669, 669 (1987).
2. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction,
36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (exploring the connection between family law and private business
law); see also Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992). Singer
writes:
Traditionally, the legal principles governing marriage and consensual alternatives to
marriage reflected a strong preference in favor of public ordering of behavior. First, and
perhaps most important, the law distinguished sharply between marriage and other intimate
relationships and used marriage or marital status as a criteria for allocating a wide variety
of public benefits and burdens. Second, the state, and not individual marriage partners,
determined many of the consequences of marital status, particularly the legal and economic
relationship between spouses. Third, the law prescribed certain premarital procedures for
entering into a valid formal union. Fourth, the law controlled entry into marriage by
restricting who could marry whom.
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law, in the private law sense of defining the rights and obligations of members of a
family, forms an important part of the legal architecture of nation-building in at least
three ways. First, access to the resources of the nation-state devolves through
biologically and culturally gendered national boundaries, both reflecting and
reinforcing the differential status of men and women in the sphere of the family.
Second, the social institution of the family and the legal framework that defines it
embody power relations that, in turn, help to shape the larger polity. Hence, laws
governing marriage, divorce, marital property, maintenance, child custody, child
support, cohabitation, inheritance, and illegitimacy define not only power and status
within families, but also within civil society, the market, and the political sphere.
Third, the symbolic family, and sometimes the law defining it, may figure in important
ways in the struggle for national identity that often takes place contemporaneously with
nation-building.
In Part II of this Essay, we explore the first claim, that national boundaries are
gendered through the use of family relationships to control access to citizenship and
thus to the resources and the protection of the state. We suggest that the use of kinship
ties in an explicitly gendered way in the United States reinforces a concept of ethnic
nationalism, casting women, and especially mothers, as the symbolic protectors of
national identity. In Part III, we analyze ways in which family structure is defined by
and reinforces hierarchy within the larger society. Following an exploration of
theoretical arguments concerning the interplay of family and social hierarchy, we offer
as an example of this dynamic the historical manipulation of African customary law by
colonial powers. Finally, in Part IV, we argue that the ideology of the family often
figures in important ways in the development of national identity in post-colonial or
post-crisis states. We then discuss the example of South Africa and show how family
law can serve as a site for the intersection of nationalist politics and the legal
architecture of the nation-building process, here again in ways that are highly gendered.

In each of these four areas, the state has ceded some of its traditional authority, in
favor of increased private ordering of behavior. Most strikingly, the sharp legal line between
marriage and nonmarriage has become increasingly blurred, as the state has extended to
nonmarried persons many of the benefits that it traditionally reserved for married couples.
At the same time, the law has accorded individual spouses a substantial degree of authority
to define the terms of their relationship and has ceased to view marriage as a critical
determinant of an individual’s legal status. The law governing the marriage process also
reflects an increased role for private ordering. Although the state still regulates entry into
marriage, parties contemplating matrimony today have considerably more choice about who
they will marry and what premarital procedures they will follow than did their counterparts
a generation ago.
Id. at 1446-47; see also Tracy Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 850-51 (2000); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 164-65 (1994) (“[A]t least a good deal of the time, in
the name of guaranteeing constitutional protection of individual freedom, [the Constitution] also
aggressively protects the very hierarchies of wealth, status, race, sexual preference, and gender that facilitate
those practices of subordination.” (emphasis added)); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (“[T]he law’s privacy is a sphere of sanctified
isolation, impunity, and unaccountability”). For a discussion of the decline of the public/private distinction,
see Michaels & Jansen, supra note 1.
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II. THE NUCLEAR FAMILY AND THE NATIONAL FAMILY
The most obvious connection between family law and the nation is the traditional
relationship between membership in a particular family and membership in the national
family.3 In most states, individuals may claim citizenship based on a family
relationship to another citizen.4 The ubiquity of the rule makes it appear unremarkable,
but it is worth asking why this should be the case. If the family is viewed functionally
as a collection of individuals with presumptively long-term commitments to each other
and a shared desire to function as an emotional and economic unit, the interest of the
state in permitting the acquisition of citizenship by family members seems reasonably
clear.5 The difficulty arises in defining the precise nature of the family relationship in
a way that is related to the purpose of regulating the acquisition of citizenship.
Marriage offers the most obvious proxy for the above-described relationship. If a
citizen and a noncitizen express their intent to establish a family unit through marriage,
the interests of the state are presumably served by easing the path to citizenship (or at
least regularized status) of the noncitizen.6
The connection between consanguinity and the state’s interest in regulating the
acquisition of citizenship is substantially less clear. The state has an interest in
conferring citizenship on the offspring of citizen parents in an automatic and
unproblematic fashion, particularly if those parents are residing within the state at the
time the children are born. Such children will almost certainly have a political, social,
and economic attachment to the state that grounds citizenship in the most fundamental
way. Yet, consanguinity alone does not ensure such an attachment, particularly when
the children are born abroad. Moreover, consanguinity is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish that a family relationship exists in the sense described above.
The relationship between law and kinship that defines citizenship is further
complicated by gender. Traditionally, for example, married women automatically

3. See Kathleen Canning & Sonya O. Rose, Gender, Citizenship and Subjectivity: Some Historical
and Theoretical Considerations, 13 GENDER & HIST. 427 (2001).
One of the most porous concepts in contemporary academic parlance, citizenship can be
understood as a political status assigned to individuals by states, as a relation of belonging
to specific communities, or as a set of social practices that define the relationships between
peoples and states and among peoples within communities.
Id. at 427.
4. This is largely true, although with notable differentiations or exceptions by country. Women’s
ability to pass their citizenship to children is not universal—some are unable to ever convey it or to convey
it after marrying non-nationals while others are required to be physically present in the country for the birth,
and many face further obstacles when their children are born out of wedlock. Some women may not pass
their citizenship to non-national spouses, and in some cases, the women lose their own citizenship.
5. The state’s initial project and continual goal is the creation of a unitary bond which transcends race,
religion, ethnicity or cultural difference, as the “essence of a civic state lies in a common denominator, that
is, a common identity shared by all diverse ethnic or cultural groups. This common denominator is
citizenship.” FELIKS GROSS, CITIZENSHIP AND ETHNICITY: THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A
DEMOCRATIC MULTIETHNIC INSTITUTION 13 (1999). When this meaning “has a more universal quality than
ethnicity, race, or religion” citizenship becomes “an articulation of an inclusive political association and
common culture that unites all inhabitants.” Id.
6. Yet, marriage as a proxy is both under- and over-inclusive. It excludes individuals who have a
comparably committed relationship and yet either chose not to marry or are prevented from doing so; and
it includes individuals who, although married, do not have the intent to create a family unit.
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acquired the citizenship of their husbands, and unmarried women were incapable of
conferring citizenship on their children.7 Both legal rules reflected the notion that
women did not enjoy citizenship equally with men.8 Although most modern states now
formally recognize equal citizenship for women and men, allowing married women to
retain their citizenship and unmarried women to confer theirs on their children, gender
differences persist with respect to the ease with which this can be done.9

7. Beroë Bicknell, The Nationality of Married Women, in 20 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS
SOCIETY 106 (British Inst. of Int’l & Comparative Law, 1962). Bicknell noted that:
Before the [First World War], in the majority of States, a married woman’s nationality
depended on that of her husband. On marriage with a foreigner she lost her own nationality
and acquired his, and during the subsistence of the marriage she could not of her own
volition change her nationality, but if he changed his hers changed also. While this principle
was not universally accepted, it was not generally questioned.
Id. at 106. Bicknell further discussed the changing attitudes that prevailed following the First World War:
Since the War a very considerable number of countries have changed their law on this
matter, either by an almost entire reversal of principle, as in the case of the United States,
so that marriage of itself does not directly change a woman’s nationality, or, alternatively,
and more generally, by the introduction of exceptions to the general rule.
Id. at 107. After discussing the complexity and wide variety of laws on the subject, enacted by over
seventy-two countries, Bicknell concludes,
The number of countries which have now made provision enabling their own women to
retain their nationality is considerable. This has been done either by providing that marriage
shall not alter the woman’s nationality unless she makes a declaration to that effect; or,
alternatively, while leaving intact the principle that marriage alters nationality, by providing
that a woman may by declaration made within a limited period retain her nationality of
origin.
Id. at 118.
8. Nira Yuval-Davis, The Citizenship Debate: Women, Ethnic Processes and the State, 39 FEMINIST
REV. 59 (1991) [hereinafter Yuval-Davis, The Citizenship Debate]. Yuval-Davis writes:
As Floya Anthias and I argued: “We can specify the state in terms of a body of institutions
which are centrally organized around the intentionality of control with a given apparatus of
enforcement at its command and basis.” The state, however, cannot be understood as a
neutral universalistic institution. It has its own history and its own material and ideological
origins and effects. Feminist critiques have highlighted the sexist bias inherent in this
construction. Carol Pateman, for instance, has shown how the whole social philosophy
which was at the base of the rise of the notion of state citizenship, far from being
universalistic, was constructed in terms of the “Rights of Man.” Ursula Vogel has shown
that women were not simply latecomers to citizenship rights, as in [T.H.] Marshall’s
evolutionary model. Their exclusion was part and parcel of the construction of the
entitlement of men to democratic participation which conferred citizen status not upon
individuals as such, but upon men in their capacity as members and representatives of a
family (i.e., a group of non-citizens). Unlike in Marshall’s scheme where political rights
followed civil rights, married women have still not been given full civil and legal rights. . . .
The construction by the state of relationships in the private domain, i.e., marriage and the
family, is what has determined women’s status as citizens within the public domain.
Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted); see also Nira Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship, and Difference, 57
FEMINIST REV. 4, 12 (1997) [hereinafter Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship, and Difference] (“Indeed, in
Britain women lost their citizenship during Victorian times, when they got married; they continued to lose
it if they got married to ‘foreigners’ until 1948, and it was not until 1981 that they got the independent right
to transfer their citizenship to their children.” (citations omitted)).
9. Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality, available at
http://www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/about/.
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For example, in the United States, different standards apply to the acquisition of
citizenship by children born abroad to American citizens, depending on whether the
U.S. citizen is the mother or the father of the child. If the parents of the child are
married, the child will be considered a citizen if the citizen parent had lived in the
United States for a total of five years, at least two of which were after the parent turned
fourteen years of age.10 The applicable statute imposes no additional proof other than,
implicitly, that the parents are legally married and that the child is legally theirs.11 The
residency requirement presumably functions to ensure that the citizen parent has
sufficient attachment to the United States to convey the values of U.S. citizenship on
his or her offspring.12 According to the statute, whatever the actual relationship

Women’s right to equal citizenship is guaranteed by the majority of Arab constitutions, as
well as by international law. Yet across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
and the Gulf, women are denied their right to nationality—a crucial component of
citizenship. In almost every country in the MENA and Gulf regions, women who marry men
of other nationalities cannot confer their original nationality to their husbands or children.
Only fathers, not mothers, can confer their nationality to their children. Discriminatory laws
denying women equal nationality rights undermine women’s status as equal citizens in their
home countries. Such laws send the message that women do not enjoy a direct relationship
with the state, but must access their citizenship rights through mediation of a male family
member, such as a father or a husband . . . . The denial of women’s nationality rights also
created real suffering for dual nationality families living in the woman’s home country.
Children and spouses are treated as foreigners and must obtain costly residence permits.
Children are often excluded from social services such as social security, healthcare and
subsidized or free access to education. In many countries, spouses and children have limited
employment opportunities and are unable to own property.
Id.; see also Interview by Anna Workman with Lina Abou-Habib, Director of Collective for Research and
Training on Development-Action (CRTD-A) (Mar. 4, 2006), available at http://www.learningpartnership.
org/en/advocacy/campaign/ labhinterview. Ms. Abou-Habib asserts that
[t]he regional aspect of the campaign undermines the arguments against granting nationality
to women at the national level. It demonstrates that the real issue is patriarchy and a male
vision of citizenship, rather than all the silly political arguments that are made when we
demand women’s right to nationality . . . . [H]owever, we have seen that in countries where
the law has been reformed to some extent, like in Egypt, the problem hasn’t been resolved
yet because changing the law is just the first step. We have seen that reform of the law
could either be partial, poorly interpreted, or selectively implemented . . . . In Egypt the law
has changed, allowing women to pass on their nationality to their children only, not their
spouses . . . . In Algeria, the law has been changed in a much more progressive way,
allowing women to pass on their nationality to their children and spouses and we’re using
our learning from the monitoring in Egypt to do the same kind of monitoring in Algeria.
Id.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2000).
11. See id.
12. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 468-69 (1998) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). In her dissent,
Justice Ginsberg noted Congress’s view on residency requirements vis-a-vis children:
It bears emphasis, too, that in 1934, when Congress allowed United States citizen mothers
to transmit their citizenship to their foreign-born children, Congress simultaneously and for
the first time required that such children (unless both parents were citizens) fulfill a
residence requirement: “[T]he right of citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes
to the United States and resides therein for at least five years continuously immediately
previous to his eighteenth birthday.” Commentary underscores what the text conveys.
Congress largely relied on a residence requirement, not the sex of the child’s citizen parent,
to assure an abiding affiliation with the United States.
Id. (quoting Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, §1, 48 Stat. 797, 797).

2008]

FAMILY LAW AS LEGAL ARCHITECTURE

381

between the parents, the legal relationship of marriage suffices to satisfy the state’s
interest in a real or potential relationship of the child to the United States, once the
residency requirement of the citizen parent is met. Neither a blood relationship nor an
actual relationship between the citizen parent and child need be proven. Rather, it is
assumed by virtue of the marital tie between the parents.
The requirements for establishing the citizenship of a child born to unmarried
parents, one of whom is a U.S. citizen, are different and gender-specific.13 If the
citizen parent is the father, the statute requires that a blood relationship between the
person and the father be established by clear and convincing evidence;14 that the father
was a U.S. citizen at the time the child was born;15 and that the father agree to provide
financial support for the child until he or she reaches the age of eighteen.16 In addition,
before the child reaches the age of eighteen, the statute requires that he or she be
“legitimated” under the law of his or her residence, that the father acknowledge
paternity under oath, or that paternity is established by adjudication of a competent
court.17 In contrast, if the citizen is the mother of the child, the child will be deemed
to have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth if the mother was a citizen at that time and
had lived continuously in the United States for a period of one year.18
In Nguyen v. I.N.S.,19 a controversial 2001 decision, the United States Supreme
Court rejected a challenge to the differential treatment of unmarried citizen parents
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 For the purposes
of this Essay, the equal protection implications of the statute are less important than the
meaning it conveys with respect to gender and citizenship. On one view, the statute
can be understood as discriminating against citizen fathers, erecting significant hurdles
to conveying citizenship to their offspring if they are not married to the mother of the
child.21 In the case of the citizen father, he must establish that a blood tie exists with
the child (something presumed if he is married to the mother), that he agrees to support
the child financially (again presumed or at least not required in the case of married
parents), and that legal paternity was established before the child reached the age of
eighteen.22 In contrast, in the case of the citizen-mother, the blood and social
relationship between the citizen and the child is established by the fact of childbirth.
Citizenship for the child is automatic. Nothing more is required of the citizen mother.
The passing of citizenship from mother to child tracks the natural course of childbirth
rather than the legal path marked out by the statute for the citizen father.
Why the difference? In upholding the statute against an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court accepted the rationale that the woman’s role in childbirth
means greater certainty regarding the biological relationship between the mother and
the child, thereby justifying the requirement of the establishment of paternity but not

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c) (2000).
Id. § 1409(a)(1).
Id. § 1409(a)(2).
Id. § 1409(a)(3).
Id. § 1409(a)(4)(A)-(C).
Id. § 1409(c).
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
Id. at 58-59.
This was the litigation posture of the parties in Nguyen. Id. at 57-59.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
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maternity as a prerequisite of citizenship.23 Yet, even accepting that greater uncertainty
attends the paternity of the child, the biological difference does not, in an obvious way,
justify the additional requirements placed on the child of a citizen father, including a
commitment of financial support by the father and the establishment of paternity before
the age of eighteen.24 The Court’s rationale was that requiring the establishment of
paternity or the legitimation of the child prior to the age of eighteen served the
important state interest of ensuring that the citizen father had at least the opportunity
to establish a parenting relationship with the child, an opportunity that the mother
would automatically have by virtue of being present at the birth of the child.25 Of
course, so long as the other requirements are met, the statute does not require proof of
an actual parenting relationship.26 As the dissenters pointed out in Nguyen, the
connection between the opportunity to establish such a relationship (as opposed to the
fact of such relationship) does not seem to bear much relationship to the state’s interest
in defining who falls within the family of citizens.27
How, then, can the statutory scheme be explained? One possibility is that it
embraces the traditional view that motherhood is biological and that fatherhood is
created, an act of will.28 The mother is assumed to have and to maintain a connection

23. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. Even granting the biological differences between mothers and fathers, as
one commentator has observed, the mother’s relationship is only certain at the moment of birth and to those
witnessing it. Laura Oren, Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Motherhood, 17
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 197 (2006).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
25. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (finding that Congress recognized that the “opportunity for a meaningful
relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth. The mother knows that the
child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for
mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship.”).
26. Oren argues that
[b]y reducing parentage to the opportunity to be present at birth, the Court denies respect
to a man who was a true father to his son, but it also limits the sphere of motherhood as well
(to mere presence at birth). . . . The dissent’s second criticism is even more persuasive: How
can the mere “opportunity” to develop a parent-child relationship be more important than
the reality?
Oren, supra note 23, at 197.
27. See id. at 197-98.
Even if opportunity counts, Congress could choose a sex-neutral alternative that required
that a parent be present at birth or have knowledge of the birth. Instead, it adopted a rule that
only crudely fit the means to the purported ends, something that may be acceptable in
ordinary constitutional review, but which is banned when a classification meriting
heightened scrutiny, such as gender, is at issue. Stereotypes, not physical differences
between men and women, underlay the statute and therefore the dissent would find it
invalid. The dissenting Justices were unconvinced that the sex-based difference in the law
“substantially relate[d] to the achievement of the goal of a ‘real, practical relationship’”
between citizen parent and child. Instead, they saw a stereotype in action—“the
generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop caring
relationships with their children.”
Id. (citations omitted).
28. See id. at 197-98. Oren noted that the stereotype identified by the dissenters in Nguyen—that
mothers are more likely to develop intimate relationships with their children, “brings us back to the heart
of the debate over unmarried motherhood versus unwed fatherhood: are mothers parents in the ‘biological
and in the spiritual sense,’ while fathers who do not marry the mothers or timely legitimate their children
are different?” Id. (citations omitted); Oren discussed an earlier application of this generalization:
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with her biological offspring, one that the law may presume and that the terms of
citizenship may properly reinforce. The child of the citizen mother is automatically
considered a citizen upon birth, whether or not the mother pursues a parenting relationship with the child.29 Indeed, the mother need not show any willingness or capacity to
provide financial support, though she might have a legal obligation to do so. The
citizen father, in contrast, has substantially more control over his child’s access to
citizenship. He may deny paternity and/or refuse financial support. Although paternity
might be legally adjudicated without his cooperation, the adjudicating court must have
some basis to exercise jurisdiction over him, making such adjudication unlikely, if not
impossible.
In short, motherhood naturally follows from biological parenthood and childbirth.
Fatherhood does not. Citizenship, in turn, flows naturally from maternity but not
paternity. Citizen fathers maintain the option of excluding their offspring from the
family of citizens, citizen mothers do not. Note also that, in contrast to citizen fathers
who face greater obstacles to passing citizenship to their children when not married to
the child’s mother, citizen mothers face fewer obstacles.30 Specifically, the residency
requirement for citizen mothers is reduced from five years if they are married to a
noncitizen to one year if they are not married to the father of the child.31 By marrying
a non-citizen then, the mother reduces the ease with which she may pass citizenship,
perhaps reflecting a notion that women’s citizenship follows that of her husband.32

In Caban v. Mohammed, the majority was impressed with the quality of Mr. Caban’s
relationship to his older non-marital children: his name was on their birth certificates; he had
lived with them; and he continued to visit and contribute to their support even after his
separation from their mother and the marriages each parent contracted with someone else.
Having “come forward to participate in the rearing of his child” in this fashion, Mr. Caban
earned the perquisites of true fatherhood and could block adoption by another man.
Id. at 194 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
29. See id. at 195-96.
Children born abroad to an unmarried American citizen mother (and alien father) were
eligible for United States citizenship upon simple proof of the biological relationship,
without much more. Reverse the circumstances, however, and the children of unmarried
American men faced substantially greater obstacles to derivative citizenship. In this case,
the majority equated biology to destiny for both mothers and fathers. Congress was allowed
to differentiate based on the “incontrovertible” fact that mothers and fathers are not similarly
situated. While the majority held that a woman who gives birth to a child is clearly her
biological mother, they ruled that even in this day of DNA testing, the proof of paternity is
less secure.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2000). A child is held to have the mother’s nationality if the mother is a citizen
of the United States at the time of the birth and has “previously been physically present in the United States
or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year.” Id.
31. Under § 1409(c) the mother of a child born out of wedlock must have been present one year
whereas under § 1401(g) her marriage to a non-national brings her requirement of physical presence up to
no less than five years. Technically the one year requirement seems to apply to mothers who are married
though not to the father of the child whose citizenship is at issue.
32. For an early twentieth century reflection on women’s citizenship following that of her husband, see
J. S. Reeves, Nationality of Married Women, 17 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 97 (1923). Reeves writes:
The idea that a married woman assumes the nationality of her husband has been traced back
to the Code of Justinian and finds justification in the Siete Partidas. The modern foundation
for the rule is in Article 12 of the Code Napoleon: “The alien woman who marries a

384

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

The statute can perhaps be explained most easily as a means of affording fathers
control over their relationships with their non-marital children. Put more starkly, the
statute excludes the children of soldiers and sex tourists who may prefer not to be
confronted with the inconvenient reality of offspring of which they were unaware. The
statute also clearly allows fathers significantly greater power than mothers to define the
contours of their individual families and, in turn, the national family. On a more
symbolic level, the statute’s gender distinction loosely tracks a distinction between
ethnic and civic nationalism. The former premises national identity on a backwardlooking, pre-political connection rooted in blood ties, the latter on a forward-looking,
modern, legal conception of equal political citizenship.33 By emphasizing women’s

Frenchman follows the condition of her husband.” This provision of the Code Napoleon was
copied in the legislation of many states, particularly of Latin America. It being shown that
the municipal law of France could not operate to give foreign nationality to a French woman
married to an alien but could only operate in so far as to deprive her of French nationality,
the Code Napoleon was changed in 1889 adding a provision to this effect: “The French
woman married to an alien preserves her French nationality if the law of her husband does
not confer upon her his nationality.” This provision had been anticipated or was followed
by the following countries: Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Bulgaria, China, and in Latin
America probably by Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
A few countries show the influence of domicile but the majority provide an automatic
expatriation of the woman national marrying an alien: Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, The
Netherlands, Russia (at least prior to 1918), and in Latin America it would appear that the
same rule was followed without any condition in Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. The British law of 1914
appears likewise to be unconditional and automatic.
....
The repeal of the section of the United States Statutes by which an alien woman
eligible to naturalization acquired American citizenship by marrying an American citizen
likewise comes in conflict with the legislation of practically all countries. It would appear
that so far as legislation goes Ecuador and Salvador alone provide that the wife preserves
her original nationality; Chile, Colombia, Panama, and Paraguay having no express laws
upon the subject, and the law of Argentina as to loss and gain of a woman’s nationality by
marriage being a matter of dispute.
Id. at 98-99.
33. Mrinalini Sinha, Nations in an Imperial Crucible, in GENDER AND EMPIRE 181, 187 (Philippa
Levine ed., 2004).
The discourses of the nation in turn have been vehicles for the consolidation of
dichotomized notions of “men” and “women” and of “masculinity” and “femininity.” This
is the sense in which ideas about gender and the nation have been seen as symbiotic:
national narratives rely heavily on the supposedly natural logic of gender differences to
consolidate new political identities around the nation; yet the discourse of nationalism itself
provides legitimacy to normative constructions of masculinity and femininity. The
implications of this scholarship may be seen in three broad areas of inquiry: (1) the
construction of nations through gender differences; (2) the impact of gendered modes of
belonging on “men” and “women”; and (3) the complex relationship between feminisms and
nationalisms.
Id.; see also Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship and Difference, supra note 8, at 4-6.
The interest in citizenship is not just in the narrow formalistic meaning of having the right
to carry a specific passport. It addresses an overall concept encapsulating the relationship
between the individual, state and society.
. . . .
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biological and men’s legal tie to children, the scheme thus reinforces the role of
women, especially mothers, as the source and guardians of ethnic rather than civic
nationalism.34 We will have more to say about the gender implications of this distinction in Part IV.
III. FAMILY AS FOUNDATION
A second way in which family law might be regarded as part of the legal
architecture of nation-building concerns the relationship between family structure and
the overarching social structure of the nation-state. Put differently, it concerns the
ways, both overt and subtle, in which the private sphere and the public sphere define
each other.35 Two points are worth making in this connection. First, although often

[A] comparative study of citizenship should consider the issue of women’s citizenship not
only by contrast to that of men, but also in relation to women’s affiliation to dominant or
subordinate groups, their ethnicity, origin, and urban or rural residence. It should also take
into consideration global and transnational positionings of these citizenships. . . . [T]he
notion of citizenship cannot encapsulate adequately all the dimensions of control and
negotiations which take place in different areas of social life, nor can it adequately address
the ways the state itself forms its political project. Studying citizenship, however, can throw
light on some of the major issues which are involved in the complex relationships between
individuals, collectivities and the state, and the ways gender relations (as well as other social
divisions) affect and are affected by them.
Id. (citation omitted).
34. See Anne McClintock, Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family, 44 FEMINIST REV. 61,
66 (1993).
Women are represented as the atavistic and authentic “body” of national tradition (inert,
backward-looking, and natural), embodying nationalism’s conservative principle of
continuity. Men, by contrast, represent the progressive agent of national modernity (forwardthrusting, potent and historic), embodying nationalism’s progressive, or revolutionary
principle of discontinuity. Nationalism’s anomalous relation to time is thus managed as a
natural relation to gender.
Id.
35. In their introduction to a volume devoted to a historical study on the connection between gender
and citizenship, Kathleen Canning and Sonya O. Rose write:
The articles collected here examine how race, ethnicity, gender, and marital status combine
to shape the rhetorics and practices of citizenship in different time periods and locations.
Collectively these studies demonstrate the critical but ironic place of the public/private
divide in the histories of gender and citizenship. The so-called public/private dichotomy
remains significant as women, often viewed as symbiotically attached to domesticity and
outside the public realm, have acted to secure a variety of competencies and immunities,
thereby placing the domestic, including biological reproduction, at the centre of numerous,
recurring public debates. . . . The notion of citizenship as a subjectivity has made clear the
arbitrariness of any imagined line distinguishing public and private.
Canning & Rose, supra note 3, at 440-41 (citations omitted). Citizenship is both “a prescribed (legal)
status” and “a set of social practices,” in which “gendered and racialised historical subjects have taken up
the discourses of citizenship to make claims about rights, belonging, participation and recognition and, in
the process, have also transformed subjectivities.” Id. at 441; see also Karyn Stapleton & John Wilson,
Gender, Nationality, and Identity: A Discursive Study, 11 EUR. J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. 45 (2004). As
Stapleton and Wilson observe,
Both individual and collective identities are located within a range of overlapping contexts
and sociocultural categories, e.g. gender, class, race, nationality, age, and ethnicity. . . . Any
expression of identity, then, involves the negotiation of an existing set of culturally defined
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understood as natural or pre-political, the family is a legal construct, not a preexisting
entity which the law regulates in some respects and fails to regulate in others. Second,
hierarchy within the family both reflects and reinforces hierarchy within the larger
society. If both of these claims are true, family law will have much broader
implications for the social structure of the nation-state than may be initially apparent.
This Part first briefly sketches the ways that feminist legal and political theorists
have articulated a mutually reinforcing relationship between hierarchy within the
family on one hand, and hierarchy within the public sphere on the other. It suggests
that family law can thus be understood as the site of political/legal intersection between
these domains. It then explores the interplay of family structures, law, and political
power in colonial Africa as an example of the interconnectedness of gender hierarchy
across the public/private divide.
A. The Myth of the Natural Family
The family comprises the fundamental principle of social organization in all
societies, across a wide range of culture and political forms.36 Although regulated—
indeed defined—by law, the family is also widely understood as natural or prepolitical. Family bonds are seen first as biological or emotional, not legal. The law

labels, concepts, and discursive positionings, thereby generating variable and contextualized
constructions of the categories in question. . . . Moreover, identity categories within this
context are interdependent and mutually constraining, such that they cannot be fully
understood in isolation from one another. My national identity is shaped by my gendered
location within the national context; while my gender identity is at least partly defined by
national and cultural conceptions of masculinity/femininity. Of course, gender and
nationality are imbricated within a complex of other categories, such as race, ethnicity,
class, political and religious beliefs, all of which converge to produce specific forms of
identity and subjectivity.
Id. at 46-48 (citations omitted).
36. See McClintock, supra note 34, at 63-65.
A paradox lies at the heart of most national narratives. Nations are frequently figured
through the iconography of familial and domestic space. The term “nation” derives from
“natio:” to be born. We speak of nations as “motherlands” and “fatherlands.” Foreigners
“adopt” countries that are not their native homes, and are “naturalized” into the national
family. We talk of the Family of Nations, of “homelands” and “native” lands. . . . [N]ations
are symbolically figured as domestic genealogies. Yet, at the same time, since the mid
nineteenth century in the West, “the family” itself has been figured as the antithesis of
history.
The family trope is important in at least two ways. First, the family offers a “natural”
figure for sanctioning social hierarchy within a putative organic unity of interests. Second,
it offers a “natural” trope for figuring historical time. . . . Yet a curious paradox emerges.
The family as a metaphor offered a single genesis narrative for national history, while, at the
same time, the family as an institution became voided of history. As the nineteenth century
drew on, the family as an institution was figured as existing, by natural decree, beyond the
commodity market, beyond politics, and beyond history proper. The family thus became,
at one and the same time, both the organizing figure for national history, as well as its antithesis. . . . The evolutionary family thus captured, in one potent trope, the idea of social discontinuity (hierarchy through space) and temporal discontinuity (hierarchy across time) as
a natural, organic continuity. The idea of the Family of Man became invaluable in its
capacity to give state and imperial intervention the alibi of nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
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is understood as ratifying and regulating, perhaps protecting, those pre-existing
relationships. Indeed, the reliance on family ties as a marker of citizenship eligibility,
as discussed above, reflects, and in some sense depends upon, this notion of family as
pre-existing the nation-state. If it were not so regarded, the concept of family could not
provide an independent justification for the boundary of the national family.37
Similarly, the concept of the natural family informs the relationship between family and
nationalism discussed below, providing a pre-political connection from which national
identity can be drawn and bounded.38
Feminist theorists have challenged the myth of the natural family, arguing instead
that the putatively “unregulated” sphere of the family is profoundly regulated—even
constituted by—the state through law and other economic, administrative, and political
institutions of state power.39 This regulation is apparent both through direct state
intervention and regulation as well as the refusal to regulate or intervene.40 In some
contexts, power of men over women in the home is explicitly authorized by the law of
marriage.41 In other contexts, it may be a product of property law that reinforces men’s
economic power over women.42 It may also derive in part from legal or social norms

37. See supra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.B-C.
39. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985) [hereinafter Olsen, Myth of State Intervention].
40. See Olsen, Myth of State Intervention, supra note 39.
41. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901
(2000). Scott writes that
[t]raditional law reinforced and prescribed both gender norms and commitment norms in
marriage. Gender norms prescribed hierarchical and differentiated roles for husbands and
wives, while commitment norms defined marriage as a cooperative relationship of lifelong
obligation. The law also privileged marriage and stigmatized other intimate relationships.
This duality reinforced the elevated social status of marriage.
Id. at 1904.
42. Pamela Symes, Property, Power and Dependence: Critical Family Law, 14 J.L. SOC’Y 199, 20001 (1987).
The perceived link between property and power scarcely needs expansion here. Renner
described it thus: “power over matter begets personal power.” But we know, too, that ideas
concerning the nature of property and property rights are constantly undergoing change and
are not confined to crude notions of ownership of “things” or “matter.” Perceptions of
property alter with time and with changes in social conditions and are themselves, of course,
a political expression. . . . The absence of property leads to dependence and therefore any
analysis of property can, by extension, reveal as much about dependence as it does about
power. Both are aspects of the same picture, a picture which shows the unequal distribution
of that which is valued in any society and obviously can be analysed according to groups
or class, stages in the life-cycle, or, for our purpose, according to the distribution between
family members.
Id. at 200. Rather than “power over matter,” increasingly property has come to be viewed as a right of
access, or a right to exercise choice, rather than a right of exclusion, which has been analyzed “in terms of
a political power relation, providing access to the valued goods of life . . . [as] ‘political power then
becomes the most important kind of property . . . [which] as an individual right, becomes essentially the
individual’s share in political power.’” Id. at 201 (quoting C.B. MacPherson, Capitalism and the Changing
Concept of Property in FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM AND BEYOND 120 (Eugene Kameka & R.S. Neale eds.,
1975)).
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of family privacy that limit state intervention in the private sphere.43 In any case, direct
legal regulation (or failure to regulate) reinforces gender hierarchy within the family
to a greater or lesser degree across all states. The fiction of the unregulated private
sphere of family functions reinforces the status quo level of regulation by characterizing the existing power structure within the nuclear family as a reflection of a prepolitical social order.44
The family everywhere is also profoundly hierarchical, with parents exercising
virtually unchecked power over children in many states, and men (whether fathers or
husbands) exercising considerable power over women.45 The myth of the natural, or
naturally hierarchical, family normalizes power relations within the family by treating
them either as a product of natural social organization, or perhaps as divinely
ordained.46 The ideology of the liberal state exacerbates this problem by regarding

43. See Scott, supra note 41, at 1903-04.
Regulation of family relationships is the domain of social norms and not of formal legal
enforcement. Thus, the argument goes, the law does not (and perhaps should not) regulate
behavior in intimate relationships. This response has some truth, but ultimately it is
unsatisfactory. Legal regulation of family obligations is both accepted and effective in some
contexts. For example, although parental responsibilities in intact families are generally
regulated by informal social norms, the law prescribes minimal parental duties and
intervenes readily when parents deviate from accepted norms. Further, legal reforms
designed to reinforce desirable social norms of parental obligation, such as the recent child
support enforcement legislation, have been at least somewhat effective and relatively
uncontroversial. So it would seem that sometimes the law functions usefully as a “norm
manage[r],” reinforcing norms of family obligation, and that at other times norm
management efforts meet resistance and are ineffective (as many people predict will be the
fate of the covenant marriage laws).
Marriage is thus a particularly fertile environment in which to explore the influence
of law on norms, a subject attracting much interest in the legal literature. Legal scholars
have tended to analyze the state’s role in shaping norms in terms of isolated rules directed
at discrete social problems such as littering or smoking in public places. In the domain of
marriage, however, law and social norms have been intricately interwoven to form a
complex scheme of social regulation.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Yuval-Davis, The Citizenship Debate, supra note 8. Yuval-Davis argues:
The differentiation between the public and private domain plays a central role in
delineating boundaries of citizenship in the literature. . . . It is the state and the public arena
which structures and determines the boundaries of the private domain—it is not pre-given.
. . . This does not mean that the state is unitary in its practices, its intentions or its effects
. . . it is important to retain the concept of the state, in order to be able to retain an adequate
political analysis of the power relations involved.
Id. at 63.
44. See Scott, supra note 41, at 1903-04.
45. See McClintock, supra note 34, at 64.
[The first trope was that of the family offering] an indispensable figure for sanctioning
social hierarchy within a putative organic unity of interests. Since the subordination of
woman to man, and child to adult, was deemed a natural fact, other forms of social hierarchy
could be depicted in familial terms to guarantee social difference as a category of nature. . . .
The metaphoric depiction of social hierarchy as natural and familial—the “national family,”
the global “family of nations,” the colony as a “family of black children ruled over by a
white father”—thus depended on the prior naturalizing of the social subordination of women
and children within the domestic sphere.
Id.
46. Wendy Brown identifies this position as central to reconciling the tension between the individual
and the family within liberalism: “Only by assuming women’s natural subordination, by assuming woman
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family structure as a matter of private choice, subject to only limited state regulation.
To the extent that it is characterized by unequal power relations, family structure is
seen as a product of individual self-determination, and not as implicating guarantees
of equal citizenship.47 Liberalism thus defines the family as private and properly
outside the bounds of state regulation, except at the margins.48
This stance towards legal regulation of the family has the effect of isolating
women and children within the home and rendering them vulnerable to violence at the
hands of husbands and fathers.49 Yet, treating the hierarchical organization of the
family as natural or pre-political also naturalizes family hierarchies of age and gender
outside the home. As Patricia Hill Collins has explained, “the traditional family ideal
assumes a male headship that privileges and naturalizes masculinity as a source of
authority. Similarly, parental control over dependent children reproduces age and
seniority as fundamental principles of social organization.”50 Insofar as individuals
come to understand their location within social hierarchies first from within their own
family structure, these power relationships transcend the public/private boundary.51
And, as Collins further observes, “they learn to view such hierarchies as natural social
arrangements, as compared to socially constructed ones.” 52 That these power relations
are assumed to emerge naturally within the family renders them less suspect when they
recur throughout the social structure. As Anne McClintock has noted, “[t]he family
was thus drawn on to figure hierarchy within unity as an ‘organic’ element of historical
progress, and thereby became indispensable for legitimizing exclusion and hierarchy
within non-familial social (affiliative) formations such as nationalism, liberal indivi-

as supplement to man, can the apparent tension between liberal individualism and liberal familialism be
reconciled.” WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 149-50
(1995) (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 788 (1997)
(“The principles of political justice are to apply directly to [the basic] structure [of society], but are not to
apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within it.”).
48. See, e.g., JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1981). Elshtain suggests that
[b]y failing to come up with a vocabulary rich enough to account for the centrality of the
social relationship of the family, even as they “depoliticized” these relationships, thinkers
within the liberal tradition adopted a set of assumptions which required the “systematic
setting to one side of the fundamental facts of birth, childhood, parenthood, old age, and
death.”
Id. at 106-07.
49. For over two decades, feminist legal scholars have produced a great deal of excellent work on the
causes and consequences of domestic violence. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
& FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000) (exploring some of the challenges of developing effective feminist
responses to domestic violence and emphasizing the interrelatedness of women’s rights claims to be free
of violence with reproductive rights, employment, child care, and economic and social rights).
50. Patricia Hill Collins, It’s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Races and Nation, 13 HYPATIA
65 (1998).
51. See McClintock, supra note 34, at 63 (“The family offers a natural figure for sanctioning social
hierarchy within a putative organic unity of interests.”).
52. Collins, supra note 50, at 64 (“Individuals typically learn their assigned place in hierarchies of
race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, nation, and social class in their families of origin. . . . Hierarchy in this
sense becomes ‘naturalized’ because it is associated with seemingly ‘natural’ processes of the family.”).
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dualism, and imperialism.”53 In short, law helps to structure the family as hierarchical;
the family, in turn, “naturalizes” this hierarchy and reinforces it as the social baseline.
B. Family Law, Social Hierarchy, and Public Policy
One way to illustrate the relationship between the regulation of the family and the
structure of power within the nation-state is to examine a context in which the
manipulation of family structures through law was designed deliberately to accomplish
particular political objectives. Consider, for example, the treatment by the British of
family structures in Africa, in particular the differences between settler territories (such
as South Africa) and nonsettler territories (such as Ghana). In nonsettler territories, the
goal of the British was to enhance the productivity of Africans to fuel the export
market.54 As a result, customary law governing the family developed in a way that
would secure land titles (fostering investment in long-term crops such as cocoa and
palm oil) and ensuring alienability of land.55 In settler colonies, the rural areas served
as a labor reserve for colonial enterprises such as mining.56 In these areas, colonial
interests were served by reducing the productivity of land held by Africans (either by

53. McClintock, supra note 34, at 64.
54. See generally Ann Seidman & Robert Seidman, The Political Economy of Customary Law in the
Former British Territories of Africa, 28 J. AFR. L. 44 (1984).
55. MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI
AND ZAMBIA 230-32 (1998).
As land came be to be seen as a scarce economic resource the control of which could be
turned to monetary advantage, competition to use and control it grew. And, in a process
which I suggest was to replicate that of the development of the customary law of persons
(through a process of the interaction of British institutions and legal ideas with African
social and economic needs), the customary law of land tenure began to develop. . . . Rights
in people as a resource were becoming less enforceable and negotiable, which meant that
rights in property had gradually to be differentiated from rights in person. As control of land,
particularly once it could be worked by contract labour, became an important source of
wealth, it became the subject of specific rights. . . . As Colson points out there was an
analogy also with political authority in that, as it was assumed that people must have chiefs
even where they had none, so it was assumed that land must have an owner, even where
rights had never been defined. The search for owners created systems of communal tenure
“with precisely defined rules.” “The newly created system was described as resting on
tradition and presumably derived its legitimacy from immemorial custom. The degree to
which it was a reflection of the contemporary situation and the joint creation of colonial
officials and African leaders . . . was unlikely to be recognized.”
Id. (citing Elizabeth Colson, The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights, in
COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 193, 196-97 (Victor Turner ed., 1971)).
56. See Moitsadi Moeti, The Origins of Forced Labor in the Witwatersrand, 47 PHYLON 276 (1986).
In South Africa, for example,
[t]he origins of the forced labor system in . . . can be traced back to the opening up of
intensive gold mining in [the Witwatersrand] region during the 1880s. For almost a century
since then, forced labor in the mining industries of the Witwatersrand has characterized the
South African economy. In the early years of the present century, European farmers and
companies forced a large number of Africans into wage-earning jobs. By 1910, the
Witwatersrand mines had created a forced-labor system which delivered hundreds of
thousands of African laborers from the hinterland to the mines. Even today, after many
years of rapid economic growth and diversification, forced labor in these mines still persists.
Id. at 276.
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taking it away or by limiting its alienability), and thereby forcing Africans to engage
in wage labor to pay head taxes.57
In South Africa, as one leading scholar of customary law observes, “[t]he first
consideration was to keep control of the African population.”58 To this end, and after
experimenting with a policy of nonrecognition, the British eventually settled on a
policy of co-opting the traditional leaders and empowering them with jurisdiction over
civil and criminal disputes to be adjudicated according to customary law. Yet, even
this strategic recognition was grudging and always subject to the qualification that the
law not be “repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed throughout the
civilized world.”59 This so-called “repugnancy clause” often came into play in the
context of family law, specifically with respect to the recognition of potentially
polygynous customary marriages and the payment of lobolo or “bridewealth.”60
Although the secular colonial administration might have tolerated such marriages,
pressure from religious interests led to sustained periods of nonrecognition of African
marriages in many areas.61
A second factor that is important to an understanding of the relationship between
colonialism and customary law of the family is the impact of economic changes that
were taking place.62 The development of the exchange of goods and labor through the

57. See id. Moeti elaborates:
[A] central problem for the Europeans in the Transvaal was how to secure an ever-increasing
supply of laborers for the mines who would work at subsistence wages.
Some indirect methods were employed by the Europeans in the Witwatersrand to force
the unwilling Africans into mine labor. One such method was the imposition of various
taxes on the Africans, payable only in cash. Another method which forced the Africans into
mine labor and a cash economy was simply the European-designed rural impoverishment
of the African population. It must also be noted that the punitive raids and wars waged by
the Europeans against the Africans resulted in the destruction not only of life but also of
African farms, gardens, and food supplies. The Europeans brought about the peonage of the
Africans in the Transvaal by forcing them on to native locations which were less fertile and
much smaller than the lands they had occupied traditionally. A special European
commission was appointed to take charge of the delimitation of native locations. . . .
Id. at 276-77.
58. T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 38 (2004).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 220-21 (defining lobolo as one of “various terms used to denote a transfer of property,
preferably livestock, by a husband (or his guardian) to his wife’s family as part of the process of
constituting a marriage,” though qualifying the English translation to “brideprice, bridewealth, childprice,
dowry, etc.”).
61. Id. at 43.
62. See id. at 375.
Herding and agriculture normally occur together with another economic condition vital to
the creation of individual property rights: scarcity. When goods are freely available, they
have little social or economic importance, and so access and control need no legal
protection. When there is competition for resources, however, access must be legally
regulated.
Id. (citations omitted). Chanock describes the impact of economic changes:
The legal history is a part of the transforming of the societies of Central Africa by colonial
capitalism and is comprehensible only as a part of that process. . . . The increasing
involvement in markets for agricultural products and for labour and the new subordination
to the state which this leads to are clearly at the heart of the transformation of “customary”
legal relations in African societies. Thinking about law in terms of legal classifications tends
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emerging market economy altered the kinship foundation in a way that shifted power
in traditional communities.63 Before the development of wage labor, elders in the
community could control the labor power of younger men by controlling access to
family land.64 The gradual commodification of labor and goods in the emerging cash
economy created new opportunities for the exploitation of the labor of young men (and
women) while simultaneously increasing the independence of the younger generation
from the family and community.65 The intensification of claims of kinship obligation
based on tradition can be understood as a means of challenging this independence and
maintaining or restoring traditional power hierarchies.66 Similarly, younger men,

to obscure what is involved in this. Lawyers conceptually shrink the major area of
“customary law” into a category thought of as the law of the family, which does not
adequately encompass what family law was about. The control of reproduction and of work
and the appropriation of the surplus were all inextricably tied into what administrators and
lawyers innocently conceived of as marriage. The disruptive effects of capitalist relations
were also, to a large extent, combated by Africans on this conceptual territory.
CHANOCK, supra note 55, at 11-12.
63. See BENNETT, supra note 58, at 375.
The great watershed in the formation of a fully-fledged concept of ownership was clearly
trade. Before this occurred, property of economic significance attracted many highly
specific rights, each of which could vest in a different person. Regular commerce, however,
presupposed a situation where every commodity had an exchange value relative to all the
others circulating in the market. If the optimum condition of a free market was to be
realized, these goods had to be loosened from the specific rights of particular interest
holders. Ownership provided the answer. It was a concept applicable to any type of property and it was available to all traders.
One of the distinctive features of ownership is its “absoluteness,” a quality that implies
the concentration of all entitlements in one person, who, in consequence, is free to use and
dispose of the property at will. The proprietary rights of the pre-trade era can be
distinguished from ownership by the fact that the former usually implied a number of
specific interests vesting in various different holders, whereas ownership implies a collection
of interests vesting in a single holder.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. See id. at 382 (explaining the power to allot land); see also id. at 222 (discussing the control elders
had on marriage through lobolo).
65. See, e.g., id. at 223, 230. For example:
Originally, the social and ritual significance of lobolo outweighed its economic value. . . .
Indeed, the long-term effect of regularly giving and receiving livestock as lobolo was to
withdraw livestock from the economy and dedicate them to a closed system of marriage
exchanges. All this was to change, however, with the arrival of capitalism. Cattle and other
property that had formerly been reserved for transacting marriages, acquired a new value,
measurable in cash and imported trade goods. On the one hand, exotic commodities were
readily assimilated to the category of marriage goods, and, on the other, lobolo cattle could
be traded for cash. As its social and ritual functions declined, lobolo began to appear more
like an ordinary commercial transaction. . . . As family ties have weakened, however, so too
has the sense of obligation to contribute towards a kinsman’s lobolo. Instead, the tendency
has been for payment to become an individual responsibility, a development that has been
encouraged by young men becoming economically independent of their families.
Id.
66. This may take the form of expecting women to forego their constitutional rights and remain subject
to a traditional system, within which their role and rights are highly circumscribed. Similarly, “[a]ctions
brought for repayment of contributions toward lobolo are not subject to rules of prescription . . . the debt
may still be recovered from his estate when he dies.” Id. at 230. Further, “[m]en may be sued for lobolo
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whose ability to sell their labor freed them from economic dependence on family land
and cattle, also needed to be able to harness labor power that could be used for
commodity production for the market.67 This economic pressure, in turn, translated
into an assertion of tradition with respect to control over the labor of wives and
children.68 As Martin Chanock explains,
[w]here a husband may not have exercised any “rights” to property in the form of
food before, and had been obliged to leave control of its use to his wife, he now
assumed that money from the sale of food was his alone, and both husbands and their
relatives took food to sell. Here the possibility of an outside market was creating a
proprietary right which had not existed before.69

This account of the interplay between customary law and colonial power illustrates
the relationship between family law and family forms, and political and economic
control of the state. Family structures and the legal norms that defined and regulated
them were understood by the colonizer as a tool of economic and political control

that was borrowed by their grandfathers or even great-grandfathers,” as “[i]n this way, obligations to repay
pass from one generation to the next,” which “doubtless contribute to a sense of family solidarity” but “have
also been described as ‘ropes which start from the neck of one and go to the neck of the other.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
67. CHANOCK, supra note 55, at 13-14.
It was not only migrant labour which had disruptive consequences. . . . [O]ne alternative
strategy in the colonial economy was to grow cash crops for the market and this also
involved considerable change and struggle at the level of production. Over most of the area
and period with which I deal in this book the availability of land for expanded agricultural
production was not a crucial issue, though after the second world war there were signs that
it was beginning to become one. The central issue was, therefore, the use and control of
labour in the new venture. One of the ways in which the customary law must be understood
is as a product of the struggle for control of labour in the changing conditions of the rural
economy. The loss of control over the labour of slaves, the potential competition for male
labour with the mining sector, and the gradual replacing of kinship obligations by cash
payments, all meant that the mobilisation of labour resources for cash-crop farming was
taking place in an unfavourable environment (though of course not all these factors were
contemporaneously present in all areas).
Id.
68. Id. at 13. Chanock writes that
[t]he penetration of capitalism relations meant not the creation of classes in an innocent
world but the changing of the bases of inequality and power, and the challenging and
disturbing of hierarchies. These pre-colonial hierarchies had had their justifications in the
ideologies of kinship and custom, and the controls imposed by beliefs in sorcery. Under
colonial pressures, these were thrown into prominence as the ideological (and, in the case
of customary law, also the practical) lines of defence.
Id.
69. Id. at 14. The impact of this economic pressure was great:
[S]queezing household labour was in many ways a more convenient strategy than finding
scarce and comparatively expensive labour outside of the household. This meant first that
the labour of wives became vital: its withdrawal at crucial times . . . could ruin an entire
crop. Wives’ work could be secured by an emphasis on marital ties. Secondly it meant that
a man striving to become a commercial farmer would be engaged in a struggle to maintain
control over the labour of his offspring, and consequently that conflict within marriage was
aggravated by quarrels over rights to children and the product of their labour.
Id.
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insofar as the colonizing power could manipulate the power hierarchy within those
structures. Conversely, political manipulation of the family and customary law altered
the nature of the underlying relationships, changing power dynamics within the family
and, in some sense, the definition of tradition and family obligation. Finally, as
modified hierarchical arrangements are normalized within the family, they in turn
reinforce social hierarchy in the service of colonial power.
The relationship between family hierarchy and a broader social hierarchy
illustrated above is especially important to consider in situations where nation-building
is undertaken today.70 In post-conflict states, pre-existing law governing family
structures may offer a superficially appealing source of social stability and continuity.
Indeed, this type of informal legal system, including not only substantive norms but
also traditional procedures and forums for adjudication, may be the only surviving
legal structure in the context of a failed state.71 Yet, the sources of such law, often

70. SHIRIN M. RAI, GENDER AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM NATIONALISM
Rai argues,
The discourses of nationalism did not disappear with the decolonization of the 1940s to
1960s. They are again with us in complex and contemporaneous forms in the post-Cold
War Period—through the seeking of nationhood on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and
economy. The process of “othering” communities populations and groups continues to
affect the drawing up of development agendas in Eastern and Central Europe, in parts of
Africa and of Asia. Women have had to pay a high price for this new wave of nationalism
and have confronted issues very similar to those faced by women during anti-colonial
struggles—rape, war, homelessness, insecurity, and being constructed without their consent
as threats to, and symbols of, the new nations and national identities.
Id. at 15-16; see also Sukanya Banerjee et al., Engendering Violence: Boundaries, Histories, and the
Everyday, 16 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 125 (2004).
[A]cts of violence and “boundary-making” that marked women as signifiers of cultural
essence and (racial) purity are not confined to the historical moment of decolonization.
Continued in an era of transnational capital, which professes to have exceeded the nation
state in both material and conceptual terms, gendered identities are constantly deployed to
mediate the incommensurate between global capital and national particularisms. While the
overwhelming sense of trans-nationalism permeating the current global scenario has led
many to conjecture the demise of the nation state, in reality it is far from “dead.” As Aihwa
Ong points out, “despite frequent assertions about the demise of the state, the issue of the
state remains central when it comes to the rearrangements of global spaces, and the
restructuring of social and political relations.” In fact, Ong alerts us to be vigilant to the
“mutations” of political and social power, of the ways in which the nation state, far from
receding into obsolescence, remorphs itself.
Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
71. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT
STATES: MONITORING LEGAL SYSTEMS (2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/RuleoflawMonitoringen.pdf.
Post-conflict justice systems are characterized by severe dysfunction, low levels of human
and material resources, destroyed infrastructure and lack of public trust. The past failure of
the legal system to protect individual rights, prosecute violators and balance executive power
is often either a direct cause of, or a substantial contributing factor to, the conflict. A history
of corruption, discrimination and abuse of power within the institutions of justice can
destroy public confidence and perpetuate lawlessness and chaos.
....
Property law and family relations, including child protection, can have particular relevance
for insecure post-conflict contexts and the use of informal or alternative (usually
TO GLOBALIZATION (2002).
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religious or customary, very often presuppose and reinforce strict gender hierarchy
within the family.72 It is unlikely that a progressive, democratic conception of equal
citizenship can be built upon such a foundation.
IV. FAMILY, NATION-BUILDING, AND NATIONALISM
The third and perhaps most subtle way that the legal regulation of the family
informs the legal architecture of nation-building concerns the relationship between
family and nationalism, or the “imagined community”73 of the nation. Although our

unregulated) traditional methods and practices for resolving otherwise criminal and civil
disputes can be prevalent.
Id. at 5-6; see also Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute (U.N.
Dev. Programme, Oslo Governance Centre, 2006), available at http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs07/
DoingJusticeEwaWojkowska130307.pdf (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of informal justice
systems in post-conflict states and the developing world). Wojkowska provides the following examples of
non-violent dispute resolution in post-conflict states:
[I]n Afghanistan court officials regularly refer cases to the informal sector or accept and
record their decisions to end pending cases. Part of this is the result of more than two
decades of war in which alternative forms of dispute resolution became the norm. During
this period without formal government institutions it was often necessary to seek solutions
based on consensus and this tradition has remained strong even as government institutions
have reappeared.
After September 1999 in the villages in East Timor, it was the informal justice systems
that asserted themselves quickly. “This was natural and not surprising because—though
everything had been destroyed—through tradition and culture the local law lived on in
strength inside people’s heads.”
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). Such informal legal systems are subject to unequal power relations,
susceptibility to elite capture, unfair and unequal treatment of women and disadvantaged groups, lack of
accountability, and non-adherence to international human rights standards, among other problems. As
Wojkowsa notes,
These systems are often dominated by men of high status and tend to exclude women,
minorities, young people and disadvantaged groups. As a result, existing social hierarchies
and inequalities are often reflected and reinforced in the dispute resolution system. Informal
systems generally reflect the thinking of a cross section of the population and their decisions
for example do not recognize the equal rights of both genders to inherit.
Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
72. See also McClintock, supra note 34, at 78.
All too often, the doors of tradition are slammed in women’s faces. Yet traditions are
both the outcome and the record of past political contests, as well as the sites of present
contest. In a nationalist revolution, both women and men should be empowered to decide
which traditions are outmoded, which should be transformed, and which should be
preserved. Male nationalists frequently argue that colonialism or capitalism has been
women’s ruin, with patriarchy merely a nasty second cousin destined to wither away when
the real villain finally expires. Yet nowhere has a national or socialist revolution brought a
full feminist revolution in its train. . . . Nowhere has feminism in its own right been allowed
to be more than the maidservant to nationalism. A crucial question remains for progressive
nationalism: can the iconography of the family be retained as the figure for national unity,
or must an alternative radical iconography be developed?
Id.
73. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 5-7 (rev. ed. 1991).
In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it
is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign.
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focus is nation-building, not nationalism per se, the emergence and consolidation of
national identity is a process that informs the nation-building enterprise. And, as we
argue below, family often figures in this process as a central trope of nationalism.
Family law, in turn, may function as an important—and gendered—site of intersection
between nationalism and nation-building.
The modern nation-state has famously been described as Janus-faced,
simultaneously looking forward toward the formation of new political identities and
backward toward a shared, “authentic,” history upon which nationhood might be
grounded.74 Sometimes called “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, these two types of

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion. . . . Communities are to be distinguished, not by their
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. Javanese villagers have
always known that they are connected to people they have never seen, but these ties were
once imagined particularistically—as indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship and clientship.
Until quite recently, the Javanese language had no word meaning the abstraction “society.”
....
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie
other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. . . .
It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained,
hierarchical dynastic realm. . . .
Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship.
Id.
74. TOM NAIRN, FACES OF NATIONALISM: JANUS REVISITED 67, 71 (1997); TOM NAIRN, THE BREAKUP
see also McClintock, supra note 34, at 61, 65.
All nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous—dangerous, not in
Eric Hobsbawm’s sense as having to be opposed, but in the sense of representing relations
to political power and to the technologies of violence. Nationalism, as Ernest Gellner notes,
invents nations where they do not exist, and most modern nations, despite their appeal to an
august and immemorial past, are of recent invention. Benedict Anderson warns, however,
that Gellner tends to assimilate “invention” to “falsity” rather than to “imagining” and
“creation.” Anderson, by contrast, views nations as “imagined communities” in the sense
that they are systems of cultural representation whereby people come to imagine a shared
experience of identification with an extended community. As such, nations are not simply
phantasmagoria of the mind, but are historical and institutional practices through which
social difference is invented and performed. Nationalism becomes, as a result, radically
constitutive of people’s identities, through social contests that are frequently violent and
always gendered. . . .
In [Walter] Benjamin’s insight, the mapping of “Progress” depends on systematically
inventing images of archaic time to identify what is historically “new” about enlightened,
national progress.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Homi K. Bhabha, Narrating the Nation, Introduction to NATION AND
NARRATION 1 (Homi K. Bhabha ed., 1990). Bhama argues:
It is the project of Nation and Narration to explore the Janus-faced ambivalence of language
itself in the construction of the Janus-faced discourse of the nation. This turns the familiar
two-faced god into a figure of prodigious doubling that investigates the nation-space in the
process of the articulation of elements: where meanings may be partial because they are in
medias res; and history may be half-made because is in the process of being made; and the
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national identity formation depend on different terms of membership, the former
premised on a political process of assimilation, the latter on pre-existing linguistic or
ethnic bonds.75 Although gender transcends these categories and informs both types
of nationalism or nation formation, as we suggested above in Part II, women—and in
particular mothers—have figured centrally in ethnic nationalist ideology.76 As Tricia
Cusack has argued, “women are defined through their familial role as retaining the
traces of the putatively historical, quasi-organic community within the modern state.”77
In times of transition, for example in post-colonial, post-conflict, or post-Soviet
states, the traditional family (whether real or imagined) may come to represent the
microcosm of the new nation, metaphorically rather than literally defining the

image of cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act
of “composing” its powerful image. Without such an understanding of the performativity
of language in the narratives of the nation, it would be difficult to understand why Edward
Said prescribes a kind of “analytic pluralism” as the form of critical attention appropriate
to the cultural effects of the nation. For the nation, as a form of cultural elaboration (in the
Gramscian sense), is an agency of ambivalent narration that holds culture at its most
productive position, as a force for “subordination, fracturing, diffusing, reproducing as
much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding.”
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
75. See, e.g., Tim Neiguth, Beyond Dichotomy: Concepts of the Nation and the Distribution of
Membership, 5 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 155, 157-58 (1999) (“Ethnic nations are perceived as social
groups that exist prior to and independently from particular states, while the definition of civic nations
emphasizes the crucial role of political institutions in forming a nation.”).
76. McClintock, supra note 34, at 61.
All nations depend on powerful constructions of gender. Despite nationalisms’ ideological
investment in the idea of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned
institutionalization of gender difference. No nation in the world gives women and men the
same access to the rights and resources of the nation-state. Rather than expressing the
flowering into time of the organic essence of a timeless people, nations are contested
systems of cultural representation that limit and legitimize peoples’ access to the resources
of the nation-state.
Id.; see also Sinha, supra note 33, at 187-88.
Nations have typically been imagined as “domestic genealogies”. Terms such as
motherlands or fathers lands; mother-tongues; mother-cultures; “founding fathers,” and
“mothers of the nation” are used to capture the relations of peoples to specific lands,
languages, cultures, or shared histories. Critical attention to these kinds of gendered and
familial imagery around the nation reveals much about the nature of the nation as a
historical project constituted in the crucible of empire.
....
The history of the modern nation . . . has been closely associated with a particular
historical form of the family—the heterosexual, bourgeois, nuclear family—and the
normative constructions of sexuality and gender identities that sustain this family-form.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. Tricia Cusack, Janus and Gender: Women and the Nation’s Backward Look, 6 NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM 541, 543 (2000). Consider, for example, the Taliban’s assertion of control over women and
the domestic sphere as a means of distinguishing its rule from that of its more secular predecessors.
Conversely, and in response, the U.S. military action in Afghanistan was justified, in part, as an effort to
liberate Afghan women from this control (and thus implicitly altering the power relationship within
families). More generally, debates about the universality of liberal human rights norms very often center
on the structure of the family and the status of women. Cultural (or national) distinctiveness is expressed
in this debate through claims about family formation.
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boundaries of citizenship and belonging.78 The cultural or religious traditions
associated with that family, and in particular its gender roles, provide a blueprint for
national identity.79 Here again, the status of customary law in South Africa provides
an apt example. During the post-apartheid period, the recognition of African
customary law became a highly contested political question.80 As described above,

78. Id. Cusack notes that
“ethnic” or “ethno-cultural” nationalism has invariably invoked a traditional and “natural”
domestic role for women. Women in particular tend to be perceived in ethnic nationalist
ideology as having an existence “prior to” the particular state, as the mothers of the tribe.
Subsequently, women are defined through their familiar role as retaining the traces of the
putatively historical, quasi-organic community within the modern state. The burden of
national “parenthood” is carried by women, although the head of the “family” is generally
male.
“Civic” nationalism has also been conceived and practiced in gendered, not universalist,
terms in so far as political activity has been represented as a masculine prerogative, and the
modern model of the civic nation, since the late eighteenth century, has taken men as the
norm for the making of citizens. . . . [M]en have based their authority on heading the
family, which in turn has been portrayed as a microcosm of the social order: women’s
“disorderliness” has been represented as a threat to the nation, including their participation
in the public sphere.
Id. at 543 (citations omitted). Family and kinship relations are “codified and appropriated by the state,
while the state, representing itself as a large family, effects a ‘naturalisation of belonging,’” of which
Etienne Balibar wrote that the national form is characterized by “a nationalization of the family, which has
as its counterpart the identification of the national community with a symbolic kinship.” Id. at 545
(citations omitted).
79. Id.
Etienne Balibar has emphasised the nation-state’s inclination to construct itself as a familial
or “racial” community, based on national kinship, and encouraging “endogamy” among its
citizens, but he also pointed to the state’s multiple interventions in and penetration of social
and family life. The nation inserts itself into every aspect of social and family life, covering
the intrusion with the ideology of caring and protection. . . . Thus, “both [ethnic and civic
nationalism] employ, in their mythology and symbolism, the language of the family.”
Id. at 545-46 (citations omitted); see also Nadje Al-Ali, Review Article: Nationalisms, National Identities
and Nation States: Gendered Perspectives, 6 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 631, 633 (2000).
The public/private dichotomy, which has women within the sphere of the family and men
in public life, has been a highly contested issue among feminist scholars. Yuval-Davis
cautions us to look more carefully into this dichotomy, and contends that the division
between the “public” and the “private” constitutes “a political act in and of itself.” States
have the power to demarcate that which is “private,” thereby justifying intervention and
non-intervention alike. Accordingly, comparative theories of citizenship need “to include
an examination of the individual autonomy allowed to citizens (of different gender,
ethnicity, region, class, stage in the life cycle, and so on) vis-à-vis their families, civil
society organizations, and state agencies.”
Id. (citations omitted).
80. See South African Law Commission, Project 90, The Harmonisation of the Common Law and the
Indigenous Law: Report on Customary Marriages (Aug.1998) [hereinafter SALRC 90], available at
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/ reports/r_prj90_cstm_1998aug.pdf. In the context of customary marriage, the
South African Law Commission acknowledged the imperatives of gender equality but noted that “cultural
pluralism is guaranteed by §§ 30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights and . . . [that] we need to eradicate former
prejudices against African cultural institutions.” Id. at 11. Further,
[a]lthough the Constitution has no provisions specifically aimed at marriage, the various
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of association and the
freedom to pursue a religion or culture of choice, provide the foundations of a basic family
law.
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customary law had never been treated on par with the common law by colonial and
apartheid courts, despite the fact that a large majority of Africans understood their
relationships to be structured by the imperatives of customary law.81 Thus, the legal
recognition of customary law was regarded as an important step in reclaiming
authentically African norms that had been disrupted by colonialism and apartheid.
Although part of the political struggle over customary law can be explained by the
efforts of traditional leaders to increase their power in the new constitutional order, it
is also clear that customary law and the family structures upon which it is based
provided a potentially powerful and unifying metaphor for an authentic national
identity.82 Customary law, if viewed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, could
unify Black South Africans not as victims of colonialism and apartheid, but as bearers
of distinctive and shared cultural traditions. To function in this way, customary law
had to be regarded as both legitimate on its own terms and reasonably uniform across
ethnic groups. Accepting the legitimacy of customary law depended, in turn, on

Of special relevance in this regard are the principles of equality and nondiscrimination.
Section 9(1) of the Constitution declares that “Every person shall have the right to equality
before the law and to equal protection of the law,” and § 9(2) provides that “No person shall
be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly” on grounds, inter alia, of gender,
sex or age. Many aspects of customary law—which generally endorses the patriarchal
traditions of Africa - could now be in conflict with these provisions.
Id. at 93 (citations omitted); see also BENNETT, supra note 58, at 250. Bennett explains:
Customary law was defended as traditionally allowing a woman “a fair measure of security
and protection,” but, in practice, she had to keep in favour with her guardian. For instance,
while a wife had a well-recognized right to support, if her husband neglected his duty, she
had no direct legal action against him. She was expected to appeal to his senior kinsmen,
to her own father and, only as a last resort, to her headman. Although the guarantors of
female welfare were obliged to protect their dependants, the duty was a nebulous one; and,
of course, a woman who complained too often or too vociferously risked being branded a
“troublemaker.”
Id. (citations omitted).
81. According to the SALRC 90:
Recognition of the cultural differences underlying this division would perhaps have been
unobjectionable, if difference had implied equal treatment. But, in South Africa, the general
policy of legal dualism was part and parcel of apartheid: one advanced law applicable to
whites and a “poor” law applicable to Blacks. Thus, for most Africans the enforcement of
customary law implied the oppressive regime of the Department of Native Affairs and the
Native Administration Act.
SALRC 90, supra note 80, at 9.
82. Both concerns can be discerned in the following quote from the South African Law Commission’s
Report on Customary Marriage:
[T]he House of Traditional Leaders (Eastern Cape), [called] . . . for any reforms in marriage
law to use African values as the starting point, encouraging “cultural borrowing” from
western values only when those values are not repugnant to African norms and when their
incorporation improves the quality of life of indigenous people. Secondly, in more concrete
terms, the concern is that the Commission’s proposals on spousal and parental consent, on
marital power, property and ante-nuptial contracts are concepts alien to African culture and
to customary law. This goes hand in hand with an argument , [sic] by the Bisho Round
Table Discussion for instance, which sees these proposals as so radical that what is created
is no longer a customary marriage but a new South African “statutory marriage”, which
needs only to be extended to civil marriages to qualify as the country’s uniform code.
SALRC 90, supra note 80, at 5.
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ignoring or denying the interplay of customary law and colonial interests described
above, and on the collaboration of traditional leaders with colonial and apartheid
regimes.83 Regarding customary law as even remotely uniform across ethnic groups
required a focus on the shared elements of lobolo (sometimes translated as
bridewealth) and polygyny, elevating the symbolic importance of these practices and
changing their meaning to reflect a national rather than (or in addition to) an ethnic
identity.84

83. CHANOCK, supra note 55, at 44-47.
To an awareness of the processes of economic transformation and of legislation and
their effects we must add an understanding of the place of custom in connection with images
of government and authority. For custom is not simply either practice or a collection of rules
for enforcement or guidance but is the language of legitimation. What is accepted as
customary or traditional depends on the total image of the “customary” society, on the image
or model of political authority which prevailed, of the model of relationships between the
sexes and between different classes of people. And we will find that in each case we are
dealing with not one set of models but several. European colonizers had their own models
of African societies, of what chiefs were and did, of what primitive marriage meant, of how
rights to use land could be conceptualised. The colonized had their models of chiefly
authority and of the nature of traditional rights in and over persons and land.
....
The weight of the authoritarian model of African society, espoused by both colonizers
and colonized, and the institutions of colonial government which activated it, changed the
nature and use of custom. It could no longer be primarily a political resource in a continuing
re-negotiation of statuses and access to resources. Legislation led to a freezing of rural status
and stratification, henceforth defined and not negotiated. Custom became a resource of
governments, rather than a resource of the people. Instead of being something that was
popular and beyond government, it was gradually incorporated by it. Colonial and postcolonial governments made the same use of custom, both favouring the monarchist model
of authority in society.
Id. at 44-47 (citations omitted).
84. See SALRC 90, supra note 80, at 43. The very existence of legislation determining the recognition
of marriages under customary law presumes a focus on shared elements and national identity. See
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/
1998/a120-98.pdf. The South African Law Commission’s Report on Customary Law stated:
In order to define customary marriage it is recommended that legislative provision be made
for a minimum set of essential requirements, chief amongst which should be the consent of
the prospective spouses. In most cases the “customary” nature of a marriage may be inferred
from the inclusion of certain typical practices, such as a lobolo agreement, a traditional
wedding ceremony or the involvement of the spouses’ families. But since these differ among
the various systems of customary law in South Africa, it is accordingly recommended that
any legislative provision adopted should display a flexibility that allows for groups to marry
according to their own customary laws. . . . The vast majority of respondents indicated
that [lobolo] should be an optional cultural attribute of the marriage with no legal effect on
either the children of the marriage or the validity of the marriage.
SALRC 90, supra note 80, at vii, 5; see McClintock, supra note 34, at 62, 73. McClintock argues:
Excluded from direct action as national citizens, women are subsumed symbolically into the
national body politic as its boundary and metaphoric limit . . . . Women are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national
agency. . . .
....
African nationalism has roughly the same historic vintage as Afrikaner nationalism.
Forged in the crucible of imperial thuggery, mining capitalism and rapid industrialization,
African nationalism was, like its Afrikaner counterpart, the product of conscious
reinvention, the enactment of a new political collectivity by specific cultural and political
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For their part, women’s groups were highly critical of the patriarchal nature of
customary law, particularly with respect to marriage, and insisted that traditional legal
norms and institutions be measured against the equality guarantees of the new
constitution.85 In their view, the right to culture, recognized in the constitution, had to
yield to robust guarantees of gender equality contained in the Bill of Rights.86
Advocates of gender equality had to contend, however, with the recasting of the debate
in terms of national identity: authentic African family forms versus Western-inspired
(colonial) notions of gender equality. The analogy between race and gender equality
was undercut and gender equality was pitted against the goal of a new African
nationalism.

agents. But its racial and gender components were very different, and African nationalism
would describe its own distinct trajectory across the century.
Id.; see also BENNETT, supra note 58, at 22-23. Bennett writes on the link between tradition, culture, and
legitimacy:
Culture is closely linked to tradition. In a general sense, tradition means no more than
the transmission of culture from one generation to the next; but it also carries connotations
of unquestioned legitimacy (as in the case of ‘traditional leaders’ and ‘traditional marriage’)
or backwardness and conservatism (as in the case of ‘traditional farming practices’). The
common element in these meanings is ‘unchanged.’
Tradition operates to give people a sense of continuity in their lives, especially when
they are experiencing the stress of change. Recent works on the subject treat it, like culture,
as an ideological construct, as a resource to which appeal may be made in struggles for
power. Hence, tradition is used, on the one hand, by people caught up in the process of
change to make sense of new situations, and, on the other hand, by colonial, and indeed
many post-colonial African governments, to give legitimacy to state policies. Tradition may
also be asserted to resist these policies. In either event, because it is constantly being
contested in the struggle between dominant and subordinate groups, tradition is continually
being adapted and reworked.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 15(3)(a)(i) (“This section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages
concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law . . . .”). The South African
Constitution assumes the enactment of legislation recognizing cultural and religious marriages. When
“interpreting any legislation” or “developing . . . customary law,” however, courts must promote the “spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” Id. § 39(2).
According to the SALRC 90, “most of the criticisms from women’s groups” target the practice of
“de facto polygyny” (the most usual form, “whereby migrant workers marry a wife in the rural areas and
later informally cohabit with a second woman in the city”) and “highlight the plight of the rural wife.”
SALRC 90, supra note 80, at 84 n.4. It also noted that “the freedom to have more than one wife has long
been condemned, and heated debate on the issue persists, as was indicated by the fact that nearly all replies
to the Issue and Discussion Papers dealt with this topic [and that] [p]redictably, very few women were in
favour of polygyny.” Id. at 84 (noting specifically in footnote 6 that Adv J Y de Koker, the Women’s Lobby
and the Rural Women’s Movement, came out against polygyny). The Commission also explicitly noted that:
The trend set by the written responses was confirmed by the workshops: there was
general agreement that recognition of customary marriages was long overdue; that these
marriages should be registered; that they should be governed by rules relating to consent and
minimum age; that the reality of polygyny should be acknowledged; that the legal capacity
of women should be improved; that lobolo should be optional and that divorces should be
granted only by courts of law. The disagreements, too, tended to follow the same pattern as
the letters.
Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
86. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(1)-(2). Further, the constitution requires courts to apply customary law
where it is applicable to an extent “consistent with the Bill [of Rights].” Id. § 39(3).
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Perhaps in response to the struggle between feminists and traditionalists described
above, a system of formal legal pluralism coupled with a rhetoric of choice with
respect to family structures has emerged in South Africa.87 This choice paradigm is
consistent with liberal individualism as described above: within certain bounds,
individuals are imagined as able to define contractually what the family relationship
might look like as it pertains to obligations between spouses, the economic consequences of the marital relationship (through the use of prenuptial agreements), and
inheritance (making a will rather than relying on the rules of intestate succession).
Given that the family is regarded as subject to private ordering through individual
choice, the state’s interest is limited to ensuring that those choices are freely made and
subsequently honored.
In contrast, in the domain of customary law the family is not constructed as private
in this way. Though family is thought to precede law, it is not because family is natural
and the law is a social construct that regulates it. Rather, family gives rise to law (and
legal/political power); these are a product of kinship ties, not the reverse.88 For
example, the creation of nuclear families is not seen primarily as the union of two

87. The South African Constitution provides:
Section 30: Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life
of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with
any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Section 31: (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic community may not
be denied the right, with other members of that community (a) to enjoy their culture,
practice their religion and use their language; and . . . (2) The rights in subsection (1) may
not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
....
Section 211(3): The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject
to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 30, 31, 211.
88. BENNETT, supra note 58, at 294-96. Bennett writes:
The common law and customary law hold widely differing views as to when legal
personality begins and ends. The common law is prepared to attribute rights to a child, even
unborn, whereas customary law would consider survival at birth a minimum condition. On
the question of death, the positions are reversed. According to the common law, physical
death marks the termination of personality, whereas in customary law death is not an instant
event that is measured physically. Instead, it is a process which is marked by its own special
rites of passage. Thus, the spirit of a socially important person [will] remain indefinitely
attached to its family and continue to take an interest in the family’s well-being.
The patriarchal structure of traditional African societies gives senior males a privileged
position. . . .
Although customary law is not insensitive to the vulnerability of children, they are not
chosen for preferential treatment, as is the case in Western legal systems. Rather, customary
law realistically appreciates that their welfare is inseparable from that of their families. It
follows that, in the short term, children may be required to sacrifice their interests for what,
in the long term, will be the common good. This possibility is apparent in several practices,
which would be considered unacceptable under common law.
....
Whenever social life depends on mutual support and sharing, the risk of conflict
between the individual and the group is minimized by underplaying individual interests.
Id. (citations omitted). A system of succession, for example, has as one of its functions “to preserve the
purity of a family’s bloodline. Thus, children who are biologically related to a deceased are preferred to
those whose relationship is only social or legal.” Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
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individuals but rather the linking of two families or clans.89 Cattle and land are at stake
as well as the lineage. In this sense, family formation is a political and legal act that
has potentially broad implications. The particulars of this act are therefore not
understood as properly under the control of the individuals who form the marital
couple but rather the extended family and community.90 Moreover, the idealized
family under customary law is characterized by both generational and gender
hierarchy, with parents and other elders within the family exercising considerable
control over younger members and men exercising control over women.91
These two systems can coexist within a constitutional regime premised on equality
only by “civilizing” customary law through the quintessentially liberal palliative of
individual choice. In other words, insofar as the family is regarded by the dominant
liberal-legal culture as a domain that can (and should) be organized privately,
customary family structures can be treated as legitimate (from a constitutional standpoint) if voluntarily entered.92 If individuals choose to embrace customary law within

89. Id. at 217. Bennett explains that
[c]ustomary marriage is not completed by the performance of a single act nor does it need
the approval of a public authority. Instead, it can best be described as a (potentially lengthy)
process that affects only the spouses and their families . . . [for the Tswana], this process
begins with a series of meetings between two families at which they negotiate terms. . . . Gobetweens and family elders are always available to testify to the celebration of a marriage,
and the status of the union will be a matter of general repute, since members of the community have witnessed the negotiations, the wedding ceremony and the delivery of lobolo.
Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 180-81.
It seems that the vertical extension of the nuclear family, in the form of eponymous,
patrilineal clans, is still prevalent today. Currently, however, these units serve few functions,
apart from determining a permissible range of marriage partners. Clans normally segment
into more manageable units—lineages—which are generally four to six generations deep.
Id. (citations omitted); see also, supra notes 61, 64 (discussion of lobolo).
91. BENNETT, supra note 58, at 248-49. (“The term “patriarchy” signifies the authority and the range
of special rights and privileges enjoyed by senior males. By implication, all women, as well as junior men,
are subordinate. Patriarchal societies are remarkably common, and, in precolonial times, they were present
in all parts of southern Africa.”).
92. Interview with Sibongile Ndashe, Women’s Legal Centre, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (June 1, 2006) (on
file with author). As Ms. Ndashe asserts,
There needs to be clarity and certainty about what customary law is. It impacts citizenship
for one. To say because I belong to a particular group, that they have agreed not to have
certain fundamental rights applicable to them, and I find myself in this situation that I was
born into, that I married into. People need to be able to get out when they wish to. Women
are given one job, one choice. If they can articulate it, “I like being here, I’m more
comfortable here,” okay. My problem is that everyone who is similarly situated should be
able to leave it. That is the promise of the constitution. If that is your respect, your dignity,
your choice at an individual level, but the broader constitution is promising you can remove
yourself. Women walked around [Jacob] Zuma’s trial with signs saying no women
presidents. When you’re ready to remove yourself that is the ideal. They need the certainty
that something else will be able to protect them. Is equality going to put food on my table?
That’s the power of the mind—all sorts of factors collude. The social and the culture are
more compelling then the economic and constitutional. This must be understood. They
collude to put women in a space that’s not comfortable. It is very important that they always
be given the opportunity to say this does not work for me. Those women with the signs at
Zuma’s trial can come back next month and be a candidate for presidency.
Id.
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the privacy of the family, the patriarchal character of that law does not create a
problem for public norms of equality.
This compromise is evident in South Africa’s Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act (RCMA), legislation intended to incorporate customary marriages into
the formal regulatory sphere of family law.93 By expanding recognition of customary
marriages, the RCMA improved the status of women in these marriages by allowing
married women (and widows) to protect their legal rights and ensure that their spouses
meet their legal obligations. Yet, the Act also grants legal sanction to an institution
that is highly patriarchal. The RCMA attempts to mitigate this problem by ensuring
that the participants enter the marriage by choice and, to a lesser degree, by regulating
the institution directly to make it somewhat more egalitarian. For example, the Act
makes the consent of the parties themselves (as opposed to their families) a necessary
element of customary marriage.94 Additionally, the statute establishes a minimum age
requirement for the parties to marry, though with the parents consent, the minimum age
can be waived.95 The statute also alters, formally at least, the terms upon which the
individuals may exit the marriage by providing for dissolution of customary marriages
on the same terms as civil marriages, including “irretrievable breakdown” or “nofault.”96
But where customary law operates most comprehensively, it defines status and
relationships within the broader family and community, governing hierarchies,
including mechanisms for the allocation of land, for the determination of inheritance
rights, and for dispute resolution more broadly.97 Choosing between customary
marriage and civil marriage is therefore not simply a matter of choosing the set of legal
obligations that attach to the marital relationship. Rather, opting out of customary
marriage means exiting the larger social system that is comprehensively structured by
customary law. Indeed, the decision to enter customary marriage often does not rest

93. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The Act responds to the longstanding refusal
of colonial and apartheid regimes to recognize fully marriages celebrated under African customary law.
As such, it was intended to “bring[] to an end the tyranny of a dictatorial recognition of civil and other
Eurocentric faith based marriages at the expense of marriages concluded in accordance with customary
law.” Cheryl Gillwald, South African Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Keynote
Address at the Launch of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998 (Nov. 15, 2000),
available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/0011211010a1006.htm. To this end, the Act recognizes
two types of customary marriages: those valid under customary law and existing prior to passage of the
RCMA, and those entered into subsequent to the passage of the RCMA that comply with the Act’s
requirements. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, § 2(1)-(2). The Act also explicitly
recognizes polygamous customary marriages, and does not subject customary matrimonial law to a
repugnancy clause. Id. § 2(3)-(4).
94. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, § 3(1)(a)(ii).
95. Id. § 3(3)(a).
96. Id. § 8(1)-(2).
97. See BENNETT, supra note 58, at 164-66.
The absence of fully centralized state structures in most precolonial African societies meant
that courts could not force litigants to accept the win-or-lose decisions associated with
adjudication. Instead, the courts tended to mediate or arbitrate, thereby seeking to reconcile
the disputing parties in a compromise of interests. Rules were not essential for this type of
settlement.
Id. (citations omitted).
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with the individuals themselves.98 Rather, male members of the two families negotiate
the terms of the marriage, sometimes without the knowledge of the individuals
involved.99 The transaction is in part an economic one, with significant bridewealth
or lobolo paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s family.100 In return, the groom’s
family secures the labor of the wife as part of their community and in support of their
household.101 Conflicts within marriage are mediated within the larger family and the
communities with an emphasis on reconciliation.102 If the wife leaves her husband, she

98. See id. at 209.
Because the young have no legal power to negotiate a marriage, customary law takes no
cognizance of their promises to marry. Legal consequences are attached only to an
agreement between their parents. This agreement, which is often termed an “affinition”
contract, should not be confused with a common-law engagement agreement. While breach
of the latter entitles the injured party to damages for both hurt feelings and patrimonial loss,
customary law allows no such claim.
Id.
99. See id. Bennett notes that
[t]raditionally, customary law treated marriage as an agreement between families, to be
negotiated by senior males and sealed by payment of lobolo. Strictly speaking, the consent
of the spouses, especially the bride, was irrelevant.
....
A father’s control over the marriages of his children is synonymous with the African cultural
tradition. Hence, in the official version of customary law, the consent of a father, especially
the bride’s father, is regarded as an essential ingredient of a valid marriage.
Id. at 199, 204 (citations omitted).
100. A “typical contemporary explanation for the practice” involves compensating the loss of a daughter
which in large part includes “the expenditure on her upbringing and education” to the bride’s family. Id.
at 224. It is also defended as a benign “language that the ancestors understand and bless.” Id. at 224 n.312
(citing P. Whooley, Marriage in Africa: A Study in the Ciskei, in CHURCH AND MARRIAGE IN MODERN
AFRICA 245 (T.D. Verryn ed., 1975)). Nevertheless, it also reflects an economic transaction between the
families that constrains entry into marriage as well as the terms of the marriage itself. As an institution,
lobolo is “central to the African conception of marriage.” Id. at 220. Bennett describes lobolo’s durability,
“whatever its social, economic and political functions,” noting it “has survived major transformations in
the economy and society, not to mention the determined onslaught of missionaries, colonial governments
and the courts,” although it has changed “in form, composition, and function.” Id. at 223 (citations
omitted). “Whatever its social and economic disadvantages, however, very few people would be prepared
to support” its abolition, as “[i]ts symbolic functions remain a powerful force” and “[e]qually important,
today, is its function to mark marriages as distinctively African.” Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
101. See id. at 213.
According to all the systems of customary law in South Africa, marriage is patri- or
virilocal. In other words, a bride is expected to live with her husband, either at his own or
his father’s homestead. Tradition dictated that her introduction to her new family should be
marked by a ceremony, which, however, modest, helped to signify the start of the marital
consortium. This ceremony performed at least three functions. It separated the socially
significant from the everyday; it manifested in physical form a change of legal status; and,
because those participating had to collaborate to perform the rituals correctly, it signified
their common intent.
Id. (citations omitted).
102. R.B.G. Choudree, Traditions of Conflict Resolution in South Africa (1996) (unpublished LL.M.
dissertation) (on file with the University of Durban-Westville, Durban, South Africa), available at
http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr/1999-1/accordr_v1_n1_a2.pdf. Choudree writes that
[t]raditional courts have a major advantage in comparison with other types of courts in that
their processes are substantially informal and less intimidating, with the people who utilise
these courts being more at ease in an environment that is not foreboding. . . .

406

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

must leave the community, including her children (who, in patrilineal societies, are
regarded as part of the father’s family), and her own family may be compelled to return
the lobolo payment.103
Under these circumstances, regarding an individual’s decision to enter and remain
in a customary marriage as signifying an expression of cultural preference seems
problematic. Moreover, adding to these economic and structural constraints on choice
is the subtle but substantial pressure that comes from the very compression of
customary law into the domain of the liberal individualism. In view of the political
significance of customary law as a marker of African cultural authenticity, the “choice”
between customary and civil marriage becomes a signifier of the individual’s
attachment not just to family and community but to nation. In other words, to be for
the preservation of African cultural values (as opposed to Western/outsider/imperialist
values) means to be for the maintenance of a particular form of family and community
structure, one that has been contained, preserved, and altered by the very outsider legal
regime that it is meant to resist. This, of course, creates problems for women who

The headmen or chiefs who preside over traditional courts are generally charismatic
and familiar with the populace that use the courts, are revered to an extent that judges are
not, are wont to play an active role in the proceedings and are not shy to suggest mediation
at almost any point in the proceedings in matters susceptible to that form of resolution.
Id. at 13-14. In late 1999, it was estimated that customary law “is probably the only form of justice known
to many South Africans” and that “about half the population lives in the countryside where traditional
courts administer customary law in over 80 per cent of villages.” Ferial Haffajee, South Africa: Blending
Tradition and Change, UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1999, at 33, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0011/001178/117896e.pdf. These courts, “which are also found in some urban townships, deal
with everyday disputes like petty theft, property disagreements and domestic affairs—from marriage to
divorce and succession” and “justice is swift and cheap as the courts are run with minimal formalities and
charge less than a dollar for a hearing.” Id. Their importance extended from their proximity to people
without “money or time to travel to town for formal courts” to the fact that “judges use everyday language,
and the rules of evidence allow the community to interject and question testimonies.” Id. Important
dialogues and disagreements around gender had already begun:
Yet the system is not without its critics—namely women, who are barred from serving as
judges and often discriminated against as litigants. Paradoxically, women’s groups, under
the umbrella of the Rural Women’s Movement, have been in the vanguard of efforts to
recognize customary law and adapt it to post-apartheid society. Discussions about ways of
elevating customary law are intertwined with debates on making it gender-neutral. Three
issues top the agenda: traditional marriages, inheritance rights and the status of traditional
courts.
Id. at 33-34.
103. BENNETT, supra note 58, at 277.
In customary divorces, the central issue is return of lobolo . . . [w]hich tends to confound the
argument that the function of lobolo is to provide for the wife’s maintenance when her
marriage ends. . . . Although the full amount is seldom given back, return of at least some
is an important token of dissolution of the marriage. To this end, the husband could demand
the same cattle that he had originally given.
Depending on the extent to which the parties had fulfilled their marital obligations,
however, the wife’s guardian may retain a certain portion. The first criterion for determining
how much might be retained is related to the main purpose of marriage: procreation. Thus,
a guardian is entitled to keep one head of cattle for every child born by his daughter. This
rule holds good even for miscarriages, and even for children fathered by men other than the
husband.
Id. at 277 & n.103 (citations omitted).
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would imagine an alternative conception of the family from within a particular cultural
location that they too would like to claim as African.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay has attempted to make the case that family law should be understood
as part of the legal architecture of nation-building. In many post-conflict situations,
the pre-existing family structure may emerge as a suitable (and perhaps the only
available) foundation from which the nation-building project may begin. After all,
family membership may provide a standard (both literal and metaphorical) for national
belonging and may offer coherence and stability as a result of its rootedness in shared
culture. Yet, unless the enterprise of nation-building responds affirmatively to counter
gender hierarchy within the family, that hierarchy will itself be reproduced in the
structure of the nation.

